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Epistemology uses some concepts which are usually understood as normative
and evaluative. We talk about what a person should or should not believe or
judge in certain epistemic circumstances. We evaluate beliefs or judgments
with respect not only to whether they are true, but also to whether they are
justified. We evaluate the person’s intellectual qualities and motivations with
respect to whether she is reasonable, rational, wise, impartial, and
epistemically responsible in general. In certain ways this is comparable to the
way we evaluate persons and their actions in ethics. It is true that we cannot
simply take it for granted that the epistemic evaluation of beliefs and subjects
is one case of ethical evaluation, but they seem to be, at least, analogous.
Whether or not epistemic normativity is a case of ethical normativity, there
are good reasons to assume that notions like ethics of belief, ethics of inquiry
or truth–ethos, which we often come across in epistemology, are relevant for
understanding epistemic normativity.
The question of ethical factors in epistemology has historically underlain
Western epistemology, even if it was not always the main focus of attention.
The interest for that topic has been revived in recent years in an unexpected
settingthat of analytic epistemology. The debate has reached such a degree of
liveliness that some commentators speak of a “value turn” in epistemology.1
The issues discussed are mainly the question of the validity of the traditional
deontological concept of epistemic normativity, either in itself or in contrast
to its consequentialist alternative, and the question of the relevance of virtue
ethics in epistemology (virtue epistemology). Epistemologists try to assess
which of these perspectives offer the soundest explanation of epistemic
normativity as we ordinarily conceive it, and how they cope with the general
problems involved in the issue, such as voluntariness of belief and the rela-
tionship between theoretical and practical reasoning.
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1 See Wayne Riggs, “The Value Turn in Epistemology,” in New Waves in Epistemology, ed.
Vincent Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 300; and
Duncan Pritchard, “Recent Work on Epistemic Value,” American Philosophical Quarterly 44
(2007): 85.
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It is important to notice that the topic of the recent debate on the nature of
epistemic normativity is narrower than the more traditional (and less contro-
versial) topic of the ethics of inquiry. The recent debate has its roots in the
conceptual analysis of knowledge and its related concepts. Thus, the debate
around the issue of epistemic normativity has started as a debate on whether
normative knowledge–related concepts, like epistemic justification and war-
rant, imply a kind of normativity that can be characterized as ethical. Never-
theless, since various models of epistemic justification and warrant incorpo-
rate the notions of epistemic duty, virtue and value, there has arisen the ques-
tion whether these notions can be understood without a reference to the
broader ethics of inquiry.
My aim in this article is to clarify some basic terms used in the recent de-
bate on epistemic normativity (including the very term “epistemic
normativity”), to present the basic positions in that debate regarding the rela-
tionship between epistemic and ethical normativity, with their respective
problems, and to indicate the plausibility of the directives the debate sug-
gested for the future development of epistemology in general.
1. Terminological Clarifications
1.1 Epistemic Normativity
We designate sciences or disciplines as descriptive when they follow their
methods to describe, understand and explain phenomena, or briefly, to ac-
quire knowledge of phenomena. We designate disciplines as normative when
they prescribe norms, standards and rules that we ought to respect in order to
achieve knowledge. The terms “normative” and “normativity,” however, do
not refer only to norms and rules. In addition to norms and rules, they can re-
fer to all properties indicated by ought–concepts, value–concepts, and the
practice of instruction and evaluation. Here we will use the term “normative”
in that broader sense that includes values as well as norms, the good as well as
the right.
Epistemology has traditionally been regarded as a normative discipline.
Although most epistemologists of old first tried to describe how our cognition
functions, this descriptive analysis was just an initial step in their project of
instructing us how our cognition should function, or what we should do in or-
der to achieve the best possible cognitive results.2 Their aspirations were to
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determine what the ultimate standard of our cognitive results should be, to
enable us to evaluate our cognitive results in the light of that standard, and to
provide us with the regulations for our cognitive undertakings oriented to-
wards their objective. Thus, when we speak of epistemic normativity we have
in mind the totality of the properties which make epistemic standards (norms,
rules, ideals, goals) such that we value and follow them.
Epistemic normativity is often linked with the evaluation of beliefs with
respect to whether they reach the status of knowledge. “Knowledge” refers
here to propositional knowledge, understood as a special case of true belief.
Ernest Sosa, for example, represents the mainstream idea of epistemic
normativity when he specifies, “Epistemic normativity is a status by having
which a true belief constitutes knowledge.”3 Several concepts have been pro-
posed as appropriate articulations of that epistemic normative status of true
belief. So we will come across suggestions that in order to obtain the status of
knowledge true belief ought to be justified, warranted, virtuous, reasonable,
and so on. However, to say that we are studying epistemic normativity does
not mean that we aim at assessing which one of these normative concepts is
correct or the most suitable for the definition of knowledge. We are interested
in the nature of epistemic normativity itself, that is to say, in the structure and
sources of the normativeness of the normative epistemic concepts.
Let us clarify one more thing. Most epistemologists agree that there is a
specific epistemic normativity, that it has to do with the demand that claims
to knowledge be objectively justified or warranted, and that it supposes the
truth as the fundamental or, at least, one of the fundamental epistemic values.
Let us call the norms and values that pertain to the specific epistemic
normativity “internal” epistemic norms and values.
It is also a fact that our cognitive behaviour and cognitive results can be
evaluated from the point of view of pragmatic interests. These pragmatic in-
terests dictate what should be the object of inquiry, why some true beliefs are
better than other true beliefs, or why false beliefs may be better than their cor-
respondent true beliefs in a particular situation. For example, such pragmatic
interests determine the choice whether we should invest our intellectual en-
ergy and resources in the search for the cure of a terrible disease, or rather in
the search for the precise number of sand grains at the local beach. Or, sup-
pose that a patient has a disease which scientists believe is incurable. The pa-
tient’s unjustified belief that her disease is curable may be more helpful for
her recovery and, thus, more pragmatically justified than the scientists’
epistemically justified belief that her disease is not curable. The normativity
these examples deal with is not representative of the specific epistemic
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normativity. In fact, the history of philosophy has seen it as a potential danger
for the objectivity that the accounts of the specific epistemic normativity try
to preserve. We will characterise such pragmatic concerns as “external” to
epistemic normativity.4
But what if there are some ethical norms and values, and in that sense
non–epistemic, the aim of which is precisely to protect the objectivity of sup-
posedly pure epistemic norms and values? If there are such ethical norms and
values, then they should be considered “internal” to the specific epistemic
normativity.
Another term that we will sometimes encounter is “meta–epistemology.”
Since there is no great agreement about its usage and it is hard to find in philo-
sophical dictionaries, it requires some clarification. By meta–epistemology
we mean, first, the question of the programmatic and methodological ap-
proach to epistemology, whether epistemology should be an analysis of the
common sense concept of knowledge, a study of cognitive behaviour and cog-
nitive physiology, a metaphysics of the rational soul, or something else. The
recent debate I am writing about is not meta–epistemological in that sense.
Nonetheless, we have to be aware that these different approaches do influ-
ence a study of epistemic normativity.
Second, meta–epistemology sometimes refers to the study of the possible
social, cultural, psychological, and political influences on our ideas about
knowledge and rationality. In this sense, meta–epistemology is a section of so-
ciological, cultural, political, or psychoanalytical hermeneutics. The results
of these studies have implications for epistemology, but epistemologists usu-
ally hold that epistemic concepts and principles imply a specific normativity
that defies social and cultural influences.
In a third sense, meta–epistemology is the study of the nature and the
sources of the specific internal epistemic normativity. The meta–epistemol-
ogy we are primarily interested in is the inquiry into what kind of evaluation
is implied in our epistemic regulative practice and in concepts like justifica-
tion, warrant, objectivity, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom.
1.2 Epistemology and Other Normative Disciplines
One of the main questions a study of epistemic normativity has to tackle is
whether the “internal” epistemic normativity is merely epistemic, or whether
it is possible that epistemology depends on, or overlaps with, similar norma-
tive disciplines in the matter of normativity.
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Logic is a normative discipline and its normativity is intertwined with
epistemic normativity. In the past logic and epistemology were not always
clearly distinguished. Today we agree that logic is about the formal correct-
ness of reasoning, while epistemology is about the correctness of believing
particular propositions in regard to their logical form as well as to their con-
tent. That makes epistemic normativity wider than the logical one.
Aesthetics is another philosophical discipline that tends to be normative
when looking for the standards of beauty and artistic quality. The ancient and
medieval philosophers used to take seriously the idea of the fundamental
unity of the true, the good, and even the beautiful. Intellectual desire and aes-
thetical desire have much in common. We will see later that Sosa notices a
similarity between how we evaluate the cognitive performance and the per-
formance in different skills and arts.5 Anyway, studying the possible connec-
tion between the true and the beautiful is too wide to be in our aim.
More than with any other philosophical discipline, we associate norma-
tive concepts with ethics. Normativity in matters of human conduct and char-
acter is the proper object of ethical studies. Yet, ethics is not interested in ev-
ery sort of normativity of human conduct, but only in the one that has to do
with the specific moral quality of a person and her actions, i.e., whether they
are good or bad, to praise or to blame, right or wrong in the moral sense. Moral
appraisal in the strict sense is possible only where we find morally conscious,
willing and responsible subjects of actions, at least in potentia. As some of our
oughts and goods do not imply direct moral appraisal, they must be regulated
by other normativities, like epistemic, aesthetical, sociological, psychologi-
cal… or simple prudential normativity. However, the border between these
different sorts of normativity is not clear and leaves room for important inter-
connections. One such interconnection that stands in the centre of this re-
search is the one between ethics and epistemology.
Some philosophers distinguish between the terms “ethical” and “moral,”
although not always for the same reason. In some circles “moral” refers to the
concrete norms of human behaviour, while “ethical” refers to the general
study of the concepts and rules involved (i.e., meta–ethics). Elsewhere
“moral” refers to the right, while “ethical” is about the good. The distinction
goes so far as to associate the moral with the deontological appraisal (some-
times specifically with Kantian ethics), while the other ways of appraisal are
qualified as ethical. In other opinions the moral concerns specifically sexual
behaviour, or what affects other people, or what relates to the commandments
of God, or what has to do with the sense of guilt, and so on, while the ethical
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concerns the good in general. Anyway, there is not much agreement about the
usage of the terms “moral” and “ethical.”
In our context, the terms “moral” and “ethical” will generally be treated as
synonyms. They refer to what we admire and promote, praise and blame in
human acts, character, and their resulting state of affairs, supposing that such
acts, traits, and their consequences are under some kind of person’s voluntary
control, or could become (more) voluntary in a normal human being through
maturation and education. Hence, when I speak of “ethical” elements in epis-
temology, it comprises both the traditional terminology of objective and sub-
jective moral value. But we can speak of the objective moral value of an act or
state of affairs only if that act or its resulting state of affairs can in a realistic
scenario be a result of the person’s free agency. To put it roughly, in the con-
text of this research “ethical” refers to any sort of evaluation which does not
make what we normally call personal moral goodness irrelevant.
1.3 Ethics of Belief and Intellectual Ethics
The study of the epistemological issues that apparently overlap with ethics is
often called ethics of belief. Thanks to W. Clifford’s article with the same ti-
tle,6 the expression “ethics of belief” has been traditionally reserved for the
question of the relation between evidence and assent in a judgment, i.e., what
level of evidence (or epistemic justification) for a belief a subject should have
to be justified in assenting to (or holding) that belief. The roots of the expres-
sion and of the debate on the ethics of belief are in Christian theological epis-
temology.7 The ethics of belief today is not limited to the issue of assent to re-
ligious beliefs, nor to the relation between evidence and belief. More and
more frequently it refers to the question of the relationship between epistemic
and ethical normativity in general.
Some epistemologists find the expression “ethics of belief” problematic
because of problems with the voluntariness of belief. They suggest that we
should replace that expression with the similar, but less problematic “ethics
of inquiry.”8 They usually argue that most epistemic norms concern the activ-
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6 See William K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” (1877), in Lectures and Essays, eds. Leslie Ste-
phen and Frederick Pollock (London: Macmillan, 1886), 339–363.
7 The target of the previously mentioned Clifford’s article was religious belief. Locke’s ethics
of belief was formed in the context of the assent to religious faith too. See John Locke, An Es-
say Concerning Human Understanding, IV, 17, 24 (1690), ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1975), 687–688.
8 See Christopher Hookway, “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,” International
Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1994): 211–212; Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An
Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996), 4; and Robert Audi, “Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of
H:\USLUGE\fti\disphi\disphi11_sve.vp
11. travanj 2013 11:39:42
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
ity of acquiring knowledge rather than the state of belief and that inquiry is, in
any case, more obviously an activity than belief. Eventually, justification may
be a function of the quality of processes and abilities in inquiry rather than a
function of evidence alone. So the shift from the ethics of belief to the ethics of
inquiry may encourage the shift in the choice of the paradigmatic activity in
epistemology from isolated beliefs to inquiry. Such change would be wel-
comed especially among virtue epistemologists, who maintain that the be-
lief–focused epistemology has neglected much of the dynamism of our intel-
lectual life.
Nonetheless, I do not think that we should switch our attention from be-
lief to inquiry too quickly. It is not at all unreasonable to expect that voluntary
involvement and ethical appraisal can be found at the level of singular
epistemic units such as belief and judgment. Epistemological tradition
abounds with voluntarist and moral terminology in reference to beliefs and
judgments. Perhaps we will not have to switch from the ethics of belief to the
ethics of inquiry at all.
Another designation for the study of common issues in epistemology and
ethics is intellectual ethics. There is no doubt that our intellectual life has its
moral aspects but, as in the case of the ethics of inquiry, the problem is that
the domain of intellectual ethics may be too broad. Intellectual ethics some-
times comprises the issues that obviously do not have much to do with inter-
nal epistemic normativity. Intellectual rights in authorship, some issues in
the ethics of communication and in the ethics of research, for example, are of-
ten considered a concern of intellectual ethics. We will find authors that con-
sign some issues to the domain of intellectual ethics precisely with the inten-
tion to show that they are not necessary for the explanation of the specific
epistemic normativity.9
The debate on epistemic normativity could also be presented in terms of
the ancient distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. In very
simple words, practical reasoning is the reasoning that guides our actions.10
By contrast, theoretical reasoning guides our thoughts, especially our beliefs.
It cannot pass unobserved, however, that our thoughts and beliefs have their
ends—the truth, for example. We may say, then, that our inquiry into
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Belief,” in Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and
Virtue, ed. Matthias Steup (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 105.
9 See Sosa, Virtue Epistemology, 88–91; and Alvin Goldman, “The Unity of Epistemic
Virtues,” in Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, ed. Abrol
Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 31.
10 Practical reasoning can be seen as merely instrumental, i.e., it guides the subject how to
reach the end of his action without determining what that end is. A broader notion of practi-
cal reason incorporates the ability to determine the end of action.
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epistemic normativity is the study of the role of practical reasoning in theoret-
ical reasoning.
Again, caution is necessary. The study of practical reasoning is a huge
project—it involves all sorts of decision–making and goal–oriented reason-
ing. It is even wider than ethics. It aims at a general theory of rationality. We
do not want to dissolve epistemic normativity in that sea of different types of
normative reasoning. Practical reasoning operates in our choices about prag-
matic ends and some of them refer to our intellectual activity, but we have
warned earlier that pragmatic goals and norms are normally considered exter-
nal to epistemic normativity. We are not interested in all decision–making in
our intellectual life, but only in the one that is relevant for the specific
epistemic normativity.
2. Analogies between Epistemic and Ethical Normativity
There are significant indications of analogy between epistemic and ethical
normativity. The first and most visible indication is the presence of some typ-
ically ethical normative concepts in epistemology. We talk about epistemic
evaluation/appraisal, epistemic justification, epistemic responsibility,
epistemic motivation, epistemic value, epistemic duty, epistemic obligation,
epistemic permissibility, epistemic rights, epistemic rules, epistemic impera-
tives. The concept of intellectual or epistemic virtue has been in use from an-
cient Greek times. Moreover, from ancient times epistemologists have been
using the language of cognitive acts when speaking about judgments, assents,
decisions to believe, and the language of intellectual desires and drives. Some
new concepts, like epistemic freedom, epistemic akrasia, and intellectual
conversion, have been introduced into recent debates.
Second indication of the analogy between epistemic and ethical
normativity is the fact that we actually evaluate in epistemology and we do it
in a way that very much—whether rightly or wrongly—resembles moral eval-
uation (see below 2.1).
Third indication of the analogy between epistemic and ethical
normativity, one which is not so obvious but has been noticed and studied
more intensively in recent times, is that the principal theories of epistemic
normativity share similar structures with the principal ethical theories and
with the accounts of practical reasoning in ethics. When epistemologists try
to answer the question how and why we evaluate in epistemology, they sim-
ply use the conceptual frameworks of main ethical theories. Ethical
deontologism, consequentialism, utilitarianism, eudemonism, relativism,
conventionalism, all have their counterparts among epistemological theo-
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ries—not equally popular, not necessarily successful, and not always ex-
plicit.11
The question is whether the relationship between ethical and epistemic
normativity or appraisal is purely terminological, illusory, even misleading,
or whether there is a deeper mutual dependence, especially whether the ori-
gin and efficacy of epistemic normativity depends on ethical normativity.
Several positions are possible.12 (1) Epistemic appraisal can be a special case
of ethical appraisal; (2) there can be a partial overlap between them; (3) they
can be merely analogous; (4) they can be completely independent or irrele-
vant for each other; (5) they can be identical; (6) ethical appraisal can be a spe-
cial case of epistemic appraisal; (7) they can be deeply associated in an un-
known way.
Although one might regard some of these options as barely plausible, they
have all had supporters in the history of philosophy. For instance, ancient
Gnostic and Neoplatonic ethics presupposed (6). Socrates’ identification of
knowledge and virtue would probably imply (5). Radical empiricism would
support (4). The option (7) may be true, of course, but it isn’t much help. A few
epistemologists today defend (1). Many epistemologists would rather choose
a cautious via media and try to find the answer between (2) and (3), though it
is not easy to clarify what it means for epistemic and ethical appraisal to be
analogous, where they overlap, and is the overlap a major or a minor one.
For the moment, the aim in this article is to show that the elements of ethi-
cal normativity are indeed relevant for the understanding of epistemic
normativity, though I do not intend to reach a authoritative judgment on
whether the relationship between the epistemic and the ethical normativity is
more than just analogous.
2.1 The Fact of Epistemic Evaluation
First, do we evaluate in epistemology? No doubt. Not only is knowledge better
than ignorance, and true belief better than false, but also knowledge is better
than accidentally true belief. We give credit for knowledge, but not for a lucky
guess that happens to be true (though we do not hide our liking for those who
seem to be particularly lucky guessers). Justified belief is better than unjusti-
fied. Warranted belief is better than unwarranted. Responsible believing is
praiseworthy, irresponsible believing is blameworthy. Reliable cognitive
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ogy,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 (1997): 3–5; and
Philip Percival, “Epistemic Consequentialism I,” Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 76 (2002): 121–151.
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abilities are desirable, and better than the provisional ones. We admire a per-
son of intellectual fairness and integrity, while we deplore foolishness and
condemn bias. We disapprove of blind certainty, but we do not like hard–line
sceptics either.
What do we evaluate in epistemology? We evaluate beliefs as to whether
they are true or false, but also whether they are justified, warranted, responsi-
ble. We evaluate theories as to whether they are coherent or not, and infer-
ences as to whether they are sound or not. We evaluate some cognitive capaci-
ties as to whether they are functioning properly. We praise intellectual tal-
ents, though we do not blame their absence. We evaluate cognitive subjects,
as to whether they have developed their cognitive abilities enough, as to
whether they are intellectually virtuous in a particular respect or in general.
In many cases we also praise and blame the subjects for their beliefs, judg-
ments, acceptances, assents. We blame them for believing a proposition with-
out sufficient evidence, for trusting an unreliable source, or for not believing a
reliable source, in particular when an important thing is at stake. We blame a
person for allowing other motivations to interfere with her inquiry and for not
permitting the motivation of “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth” to hold sway, though we will not praise the same person if she becomes
exaggeratedly doubtful. Hence, cognitive subjects, cognitive abilities and in-
tellectual character traits, single and combined beliefs, judgments, assents
and acceptances, are all subject to some kind of epistemic evaluation.
When do we evaluate in epistemology? It seems that we evaluate both
when the subject seems to have control over his cognitive behaviour, and
when he does not have such control (e.g., in the case of natural abilities and
talents). Epistemic evaluation operates both from a subjective and an objec-
tive point of view, in proportion to the degree of the responsibility expected
and actually exercised, but also in proportion to the degree in which the de-
sired goal has been realized, whether or not there has been any responsibility
on the part of the subject.
Does epistemic evaluation in all these cases come close to how we evalu-
ate in ethics? Yes and no. No, if we presuppose that moral appraisal always re-
quires a high degree of voluntary involvement. Yes, if we allow that moral ap-
praisal applies to a fair range of low–degree voluntary actions and qualities.
The distinction between the objective and the subjective point of view that is
common in ethical appraisal is one way how to deal with the variety of the
types and degrees of voluntariness in human behaviour. Epistemic appraisal
also distinguishes these two points of view and operates from both of them. It
may seem that epistemology tends to emphasise the objective pole of evalua-
tion, while it is more typical for ethics to emphasise the subjective pole. None-
theless, epistemic appraisal does operate at the subjective level of evaluation,
and that is enough to take the possibility of connection between epistemic
and moral responsibility seriously.
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2.2 Epistemic Duty
Every evaluation happens in view of something, in a perspective or horizon of
normativity. What is the horizon of epistemic evaluation? We can approach
this question from two different positions, which also indicate the two major
directions in the theories of ethical normativity. First, we can understand it as
a question about the values and ends that underlie epistemic appraisal.
Epistemic operations, processes, states and faculties aim at some ends.
Hence, the study of epistemic appraisal should start with the study of these
valuable ends. We can call this approach teleological.
However, a more typical approach in modern epistemology is not to ask
about epistemic values and ends, but to try to explain epistemic appraisal in
terms of an a priori epistemic duty or obligation from which all epistemic
norms emanate in the forms of imperatives, permissions and prohibitions.
Hence, epistemic operations and states are evaluated in view of their respect
or disrespect of the epistemic duty. Following the now established epistemic
terminology, we will call this approach deontological. Note that
“deontological” is not the same as “deontic.”13 The concepts like duty, obliga-
tion, permission, prohibition, right, wrong, and justification itself, are all
deontic, but that does not mean they necessarily imply a deontological model
of normativity. Instead of an a priori obligation, they can be understood in
personalist and eudemonist terms of good life, for example.
Somewhat anachronistically, the roots of epistemic deontologism have
been traced back to Descartes and Locke because of the appearance of deontic
terms in their epistemologies.14 A clearly deontological approach is more evi-
dent, though not yet worked out as a theory, in some nineteenth century
epistemologies, such as the aforementioned Clifford’s ethics of belief. Clifford
argued that it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe any-
thing upon insufficient evidence. Accepting beliefs on insufficient evidence
is, in his terms, “sinful” because it is a defiance of the “duty to mankind” that
we have as rational beings.15
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Ethics of Belief’ Reconsidered,” in Knowledge, Truth and Duty, ed. Steup, 21.
13 Some epistemologists do not make this distinction. For example, when Alston argues
against the deontological concept of justification he actually attacks all deontic concepts of
justification. On the other hand, Zagzebski rejects deontological explanation of epistemic
normativity, but she keeps deontic concepts like epistemic duty and obligation, and pro-
poses a eudemonist explanation for them. See Alston, “The Deontological Conception of
Epistemic Justification,” 257–260; and Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 232–255.
14 For an account of the history of the deontological tradition in epistemology, see Alvin
Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), Ch.1.
15 See Clifford, “Ethics of Belief,” 344. Because of its history, the ethics of belief is often associ-
ated with the deontological approach in epistemic normativity. It is not uncommon for the
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Epistemic deontologism had been, however, more a matter of presupposi-
tion than conclusion until its role was clearly recognized in the post–Gettier
debates on the theory of knowledge.16 Since then it has been frequently asso-
ciated with the classical internalist theories of justification, such as that of
Roderick Chisholm. It still has supporters, mainly among the representatives
of the various new versions of internalism.17
The starting point of the deontologist account of epistemic justification is
the fact that knowledge is a form of the positive appraisal of belief and that
positive appraisal is not given gratuitously. The claim to knowledge must be
justified somehow. It has come almost naturally to think of epistemic justifi-
cation as a compliance with the obligation that is imposed on us in virtue of
our being rational creatures. For a belief to be epistemically justified means to
meet the requirements of epistemic duty. Hence, a subject is justified in be-
lieving a proposition as long as he does not violate the epistemic obligations
required for believing that proposition, or as long as believing that proposi-
tion is permissible for him.18
Do epistemic deontologists hold that epistemic justification is a sort of
ethical appraisal? It seems that most older–generation epistemic
deontologists have understood that respect for epistemic obligation is praise-
worthy in a moral sense, while its violation is morally blameworthy. That is
certainly true of Clifford’s and Chisholm’s versions of epistemic
deontologism. Chisholm explicitly defended the position that epistemic duty
is a moral duty and, consequently, epistemic normativity is a sort of ethical
normativity.19 It is possible, however, to argue for the analogy between
epistemic and moral duty without subordinating the former to the latter, and
without even implying their deeper connection.20
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supporters of the teleological approach to sometimes describe themselves as opponents of
the ethics of belief, even if they may basically agree that there are ethical factors in epistemic
justification.
16 See Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121–123.
17 See Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1957), 6–7, 9–10, 13–14; “Firth and the Ethics of Belief,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 119–128, and Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 57–58; Carl Ginet, “Deciding to Believe,” in
Knowledge, Truth and Duty, ed. Steup, 63–76; Matthias Steup, “Doxastic Voluntarism and
Epistemic Deontology,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 25–56; John Pollock, Contemporary The-
ories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 7–8.
18 “A justified belief is one that it is ’epistemologically permissible’ to hold.” Pollock, Contem-
porary Theories of Knowledge, 7. See also Ginet, “Deciding to Believe,” 75.
19 See Clifford, “Ethics of Belief,” 344; and Chisholm, “Firth and the Ethics of Belief,” 119.
Compare with Roderick Firth, “Chisholm and the Ethics of Belief” (1959), in In Defense of
Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures by Roderick Firth, ed. John Troyer (Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 143–155.
20 See Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 7–8.
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2.3 Epistemic Teleology
A different approach to the question of the source of epistemic normativity is
the one that states that epistemic norms and standards owe their normativity
to the value of the epistemic end that is to be achieved. Because it defines
epistemic normativity in terms of the epistemic end, we will call that ap-
proach teleological. We are aware, however, that the term “teleological” in
ethics refers to some very different and often contrary theories. Both Aristote-
lian virtue ethics and utilitarian consequentialism are categorised as teleolog-
ical ethical theories, but they propose different ideas about what the primary
object of evaluation is and what the end is.
In the Aristotelian virtue ethics the primary object of evaluation is the
character of the person, or simply the person as good or bad. The end in view
of which the person is praised or blamed is the perfection of human nature, or
eudemonia, traditionally understood as a life of virtue. In utilitarian
consequentialism the primary object of evaluation are the consequences of
actions. The end in view of which the consequences are evaluated is the best
possible state of affairs, often understood as quantitatively measurable.
Consequentialism has its own account of virtue, but virtue is defined as a trait
or capacity that makes the person habitually successful in producing good
states of affairs. The supposed intrinsic moral goodness or virtuousness of the
person has a marginal role, if any. As we will see in the following sections,
something similar happens in the accounts of epistemic teleology proposed
by epistemic consequentialism and responsibilist virtue epistemology.
Epistemic consequentialism evaluates cognitive acts in respect to the
value of their cognitive results.21 Now, consequentialism in matters of cogni-
tion does not have to be committed to the objectivity of epistemic norms. It
may have some other goals in view. For instance, an evolutionary theory of
epistemic value may propose the survival of species as the measure of
epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialists, however, usually defend
the specificity of epistemic normativity and reject the idea that the justifica-
tion of each belief is a function of that very belief’s pragmatic consequences.
What they see as the primary epistemic goal and the critical value for
epistemic justification is true belief, or simply the truth. Hence, according to
typical epistemic consequentialist accounts, a belief–producing act, process,
or faculty is justified only if it produces a sufficiently high ratio of true beliefs
over false beliefs.22
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21 See Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1986), 95, 97–103; and Percival, “Epistemic Consequentialism I,” 121, 129, 132.
22 See Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 3, 26.
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Epistemic consequentialism is a theory of epistemic normativity typical
of reliabilist theories of justification.23 Reliabilism comes in the forms of pro-
cess–reliabilism and faculty or virtue reliabilism. An example of process
reliabilism is Alvin Goldman’s theory of justification. He argues that for a be-
lief to count as knowledge it must be caused by a generally reliable process.24
Faculty reliabilism, analogously, argues that the crucial role in epistemic jus-
tification belongs to reliable intellectual faculties, virtues, capacities, or com-
petence. An example of faculty or virtue reliabilism is Ernest Sosa’s episte-
mology, which will be one of our principal partners in dialogue in this re-
search. Both in process and faculty reliabilism, reliability means high expec-
tancy of successful truth–conduciveness.
True beliefs are a counterpart of states of affairs in ethical
consequentialism. But the fact that epistemic consequentialism uses a model
of epistemic normativity that has roots in one ethical theory does not mean
that epistemic consequentialism sees epistemic appraisal as a sort of moral
appraisal. As a matter of fact, it typically does not. Goldman and Sosa, for ex-
ample, recognize the importance of intellectual ethics as discipline, but deny
the relevance of moral appraisal for epistemic normativity.25 There is, of
course, the general problem in consequentialist ethical theories of finding a
place for a specifically moral value that is not explainable in terms of prag-
matic utility.
2.4 Virtue Epistemology
Before I delineate the responsibilist virtue ethical understanding of epistemic
teleology and epistemic value, I have to say a few words about the develop-
ment of recent virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemology can be broadly de-
fined as an approach to epistemology that applies the elements of virtue theo-
ries to epistemological problems. It is a contemporary approach in analytic
epistemology, but virtue epistemologists often find similarities between their
project and the epistemologies of Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Reid, Dewey,
Pierce.
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23 There is a significant agreement among epistemologists about that. See Goldman,
Epistemology and Cognition, 103; Jonathan Dancy, “Supervenience, Virtues and Conse-
quences,” in Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, ed. Guy
Axtell (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 78, 83; Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind,
8–10; Percival, “Epistemic Consequentialism I,” 125.
24 See Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 51. In a later article Goldman also favours fac-
ulty–reliabilism. See Alvin Goldman, “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,” in
Knowledge, Belief, and Character, ed. Axtell, 10.
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What unites the variety of virtue epistemologies is their belief that crucial
to all these issues is the role of the cognitive abilities of the knowing subject.
They fundamentally agree, as J. Greco puts it, “that the normative properties
of beliefs are to be defined in terms of the normative properties of agents,
rather than the other way around.”26 What distinguishes different virtue
epistemologies is, principally, how they understand intellectual virtue,
whether it is an excellence of reliable cognitive faculties (E. Sosa), or an intel-
lectual and moral character trait (L. Zagzebski). The former view is often
called virtue reliabilism, while the latter is called virtue responsibilism. Con-
sequently, these virtue epistemologies differ in regard to whether there is a
weak or a strong connection between ethics and epistemic normativity.
Virtue epistemology was first proposed by Sosa as a reliabilist theory of
knowledge, a faculty reliabilist theory, to be precise.27 Essentially, faculty
reliabilism maintains that true belief is justified or warranted when it is ac-
quired through an apt exercise of the subject’s reliable cognitive faculties in
their suitable environment. Sosa calls his version of faculty reliabilism a vir-
tue epistemology and argues that for a belief to qualify as knowledge “it re-
quires the belief to derive from an intellectual virtue or faculty.”28 The term
“intellectual virtue” in Sosa’s usage refers to all cognitive faculties and skills,
innate or acquired (e.g., perception, introspection, memory, logical reason-
ing), which prove to be reliable in acquiring a high ratio of true beliefs. Note
that virtues in this context do not have much to do with moral virtues and vir-
tue ethics.29 Sosa’s intellectual virtues are defined and unified exclusively by
their successful truth–conduciveness. He puts the emphasis on reliability
rather than on virtuousness. His approach has been rightly called virtue
reliabilism.30
Reliabilism is in general an externalist theory of justification. Externalism
maintains that justificatory grounds or reasons do not have to be accessible to
the subject’s consciousness. The subject can have knowledge without being
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25 See Sosa, Virtue Epistemology, 88–91; and Goldman, “The Unity of Epistemic Virtues,” 31.
26 John Greco, “Virtue Epistemology,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/
#Scop (accessed June 22, 2009).
27 See Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of
Knowledge” (1980), in Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165-191. Plantinga’s proper function theory has
many characteristics of a virtue reliabilist theory, but he does not accept virtue terminology.
See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1993);
and “Why We Need Proper Function,” Nous 27 (1993): 78–81.
28 Ernest Sosa, “Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue,” in Knowledge, Belief, and Character, ed.
Axtell, 31.
29 When Sosa proposed his virtue epistemology first time he suggested that there may be a par-
allelism between intellectual and moral virtues, but he did not follow that path later. See
Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” 189–190.
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able to give reasons why his belief is justified or warranted, nor is he obliged
to do that. It is, therefore, much easier for externalists to explain why we do
not have to be all epistemologists in order to have knowledge, and why little
children and perhaps animals can have knowledge. It is not easy, however,
for virtue reliabilists to explain why we give so much importance to epistemic
responsibility in justification of our beliefs and in our cognitive behaviour
generally.31
One group of virtue epistemologists finds the neglect of epistemic respon-
sibility a major problem with virtue reliabilism. Lorraine Code argues that it is
actually epistemic responsibility that should have the status of the central
epistemic virtue from which all other intellectual virtues radiate. She also
suggests that the best way to explain epistemic responsibility is in terms of
ethical virtue theory. Accordingly, she christens her vision of virtue episte-
mology “virtue responsibilism.” That name now refers to all virtue
epistemologies that make similar suggestions.32
Code does not, however, apply her virtue responsibilism to the traditional
problems of the analytic theory of knowledge and justification. Hers is a pro-
gram for a more radical reorientation in epistemology. She objects that the tra-
ditional analytic epistemology has become too narrow and has neglected the
areas of cognitive life that deserve priority. She emphasises that the individ-
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30 Sosa usually calls his theory of knowledge “virtue perspectivism.” The terminological dis-
tinction between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism was introduced first by Guy
Axtell and has been accepted by many other authors afterwards. See Guy Axtell, “Recent
Work on Virtue Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 410–430.
31 John Greco’s “agent reliabilism” proposes a definition of knowledge that incorporates
epistemic responsibility, i.e., conscientiousness, while remaining a form of virtue
reliabilism. See John Greco, “Agent Reliabilism,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 273
–296; “Virtues in Epistemology,” in Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Paul K. Moser
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 287–315, and “Knowledge as Credit for True Be-
lief,” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, eds. Michael
DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 111–134.
32 See Lorraine Code, “Toward a ’Responsibilist’ Epistemology,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 45 (1984): 29–50, and Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, NH:
University Press of New England, 1987); James A. Montmarquet, “Epistemic Virtue,” Mind
96 (1987): 482–497, and Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1993); Linda Zagzebski, “Intellectual Virtue and Religious Episte-
mology,” in Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief, eds. Elizabeth
S. Radcliffe and Carol J. White (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), 171–187; Zagzebski, Virtues of
the Mind (1996); W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998); Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues:
An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). Jonathan Kvanvig
proposes a version of virtue epistemology which emphasizes the social aspect of intellectual
virtue, but his theory cannot be called responsibilist. See Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Intellec-
tual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Epistemology (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992).
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ual cognitive subject is a part of a community, with all the moral requirements
that fact entails, and that the appropriate context for epistemological analysis
is the descriptive narrative, rather than exchange of abstract examples and
counter–examples, which is so typical for analytic epistemology.33
James Montmarquet also argues that epistemic responsibility, or
epistemic conscientiousness, is the principal intellectual virtue. We need
epistemic responsibility for understanding normativity in epistemology.
Epistemic normativity presupposes that the person is responsible for making
a reasonable effort in regard to truth at the motivational and practical level.34
He goes a step further towards virtue ethics by modelling intellectual virtue
after Aristotle’s notion of moral virtue. Montmarquet defines intellectual vir-
tues as acquired character traits defined by their specific motivation, which is
the desire for truth. Intellectual virtues are the qualities that a person who de-
sires truth would want to have.35 The motivational component is necessary
for the intellectual virtue while, in his specific view, truth–conduciveness is
not. His examples of intellectual virtues are impartiality, intellectual courage,
intellectual sobriety, open–mindedness, perseverance, and so on. By con-
trast, memory and perception are not virtues, but simply cognitive faculties.
Montmarquet maintains that the acquisition and exercise of intellectual
virtue is sufficiently under the control of the person that the person can be
praised or blamed for having or not having them, and that appraisal is of the
sort we find in ethics. Epistemic virtues, hence, involve a moral element. Re-
sponsibility in thinking is not separate from responsibility in acting. He be-
lieves that it is possible to form a unified normative science that connects eth-
ics and epistemology.36
Linda Zagzebski’s virtue responsibilism is considered the most system-
atic development of a unified theory of intellectual and moral virtue.37 She ar-
gues that intellectual virtues are a subset of moral virtues, that epistemic eval-
uation is ultimately a special case of ethical evaluation and that normative
epistemology is a branch of ethics.38 Besides, she applies her model of intel-
lectual virtue to the conventional issues in analytic theory of knowledge and
justification. Though her success in the latter enterprise has been ques-
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33 See Code, “Toward a ’Responsibilist’ Epistemology,” 39–40, and Epistemic Responsibility,
201, 253–254.
34 See Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, 55.
35 See Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, 30.
36 See Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, ix–x, 108.
37 See Axtell, “Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology,” 411; Jason Baehr, “Character in Episte-
mology,” Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 479; and John Greco, “Virtue Epistemology,” in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology–virtue/
(accessed May 1, 2009).
38 See Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 258.
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tioned,39 the issues she raised as well as the solutions she proposed in the the-
ory of epistemic normativity, have had a notable impact on the successive de-
bates.
2.5 Epistemic Value
Let us now return to the issue of epistemic teleology and value. As we have
pointed out earlier, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism both ap-
proach the issue of epistemic normativity from a teleological point of view,
yet differ remarkably on the nature of epistemic value.
There are many epistemic values. Alvin Plantinga lists twenty one of
them and says there are a thousand others.40 In a broad sense, all epistemic
states and results that we consider important can count as epistemic values.
Among them, knowledge is the most interesting one for us, though some epis-
temologists, Jonathan Kvanvig most notably, would give priority to the value
of understanding.41 Anyway, when we ask about epistemic value, we want to
know which one is the value, the end from which all other valuable epistemic
norms and goods receive their status of being distinctively epistemic. The his-
tory of epistemology is unanimous in the view that the epistemic value and
goal par excellence is the truth (and avoiding error as its obverse).42 That is
not, of course, the truth as a semantic or ontological issue. In the context of re-
cent debates on epistemic value, “truth” usually means having true beliefs or
true judgments. Older epistemologies often understood the truth as a value
“in itself,” “for its own sake,” something more than a quality of belief.
Before we proceed, I have to point out that the question of the value of
truth or true beliefs is different from the question of the value of knowledge.
True beliefs may be valuable because of their usefulness, or in themselves, or
because of their role in Aristotelian theoretical contemplation, or for some
other reason. We do not have to deal with that issue here. For the moment, we
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39 See John Greco, “Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 60 (2000): 179–184; William P. Alston, “Virtue and Knowledge,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): 185–189; Baehr, “Character in Epistemology,”
495–496; Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 11–15.
40 See Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 3; and Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues,
33.
41 See Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); also Linda Zagzebski, “Recovering Understand-
ing,” in Knowledge, Truth and Duty, ed. Steup, 237–243.
42 I do not intend to enter into the controversy whether the pursuit of the truth is a different
value from avoiding falsehood. For more information about that, see Paul Horwich, “The
Value of Truth,” Nous 40 (2006): 347–360.
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will simply follow our basic intuition that the truth is valuable, without fur-
ther questions.
Why do we value knowledge? Our prima facie response is clear: because
it provides us with true beliefs. There is a problem, however, with this sponta-
neous response. Knowledge is not mere true belief. For example, we can have
a true belief by a lucky guess without having knowledge. Knowledge must be
more valuable than true belief. But why? Does this mean that there is an extra
epistemic value in knowledge added to the value of true belief? This is the
point where different notions of epistemic teleology come to light.
The problem of the higher value of knowledge over true belief was no-
ticed rather early in the history of epistemology. It was first formulated in
Plato’s Meno where Socrates and Meno discuss “why knowledge is prized
higher than correct opinion, and why knowledge differs from correct opin-
ion.”43 If you have a correct opinion, i.e., true belief, about the way to Larissa,
that true belief will bring you to Larissa anyway. Why bother about knowl-
edge, then? The immediate, but not accepted response in Plato’s dialogue was
that knowledge is necessarily successful and safer than mere correct opinion
(i.e., true belief). Socrates then gives a response to the question in the form of a
definition: knowledge is different from correct opinion because it is “tied
down” by giving “an account of the reason why,” or as he puts it in Theaetetus,
because knowledge is “true judgment with an account with lógos.”44
In recent times the question of the value of knowledge has been revived in
the context of the reliabilist theory of knowledge, more precisely in the debate
between the reliabilist and responsibilist versions of virtue epistemology.45 It
was Zagzebski who suggested that a theory of knowledge should be able to
give an account of the value of knowledge. She has been arguing ever since
that the externalist theories of knowledge, virtue reliabilism included, do not
give a satisfactory explanation of the nature of epistemic value.46
Zagzebski argues that the value of knowledge cannot be reduced to the
value of true belief alone. If knowledge is true belief plus something, e.g., a
factor that makes true belief justified or warranted, that something must have
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43 Plato, Meno, 98a6–8, in Plato: Complete Works, trans. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1997), 895–896.
44 Plato, Meno, 98a3 (Cooper 895), and Theatetus, 201d (Cooper 223).
45 Duncan Pritchard maintains that the reasons for the increased interest in epistemic value
should be looked for in the rise of virtue epistemology and in the dissatisfaction of some
epistemologists with the way the work on the issue of Gettier problem has been developing.
See Duncan Pritchard, “Recent Work on Epistemic Value,” American Philosophical Quar-
terly, 44 (2007): 85–86.
46 See Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 300, 312, and “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemol-
ogy,” in Knowledge, Belief and Character, ed. Axtell, 113–123.
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its specific value that makes it worthy of pursuit. She finds that added ele-
ment in the motivational component of the intellectual virtue, which is the
desire of knowledge or the love of the truth and, ultimately, the intellectual
eudemonia, which is an aspect of the holistic eudemonia conceived as “good
life:” “An epistemic agent gets credit for getting a true belief when she arrives
at true belief because of her virtuous intellectual acts motivated by the love of
truth. She gets credit for a desirable true belief when she arrives at a desirable
true belief because of acts motivated by love of true beliefs that are compo-
nents of a good life.”47 Epistemic value is so an ethical value. Note that the
claim that the ethical absorbs the epistemically normative altogether depends
on how wide one extends the domain of ethics. Zagzebski’s claims do not
sound so exorbitant if that domain comprises everything that concerns the
holistic well–being of human persons. In fact, that is what Zagzebski’s
neo–Aristotelian virtue ethics implies, and that was the mainstream position
in Pre-modern ethics.
Since Zagzebski holds that the cognitive subject as agent is responsible
(in a limited but sufficient degree) for his epistemic motivations and cognitive
self–formation, he is also praiseworthy or blameworthy for that in a moral
sense. Zagzebski accepts deontic moral evaluation in epistemology, though it
is not based on an a priori deontology, but on an eudemonist virtue ethics.
Also, she argues that hers is an agent–based model of epistemic normativity,
which explains why knowledge is a credit given to the knower, rather than a
praise of a single act of belief, or a praise of a cognitive ability separated from
the knower. By contrast, epistemic deontologism and epistemic
consequentialism are both act–based.
Zagzebski’s virtue theory is Aristotelian, but her account of epistemic
evaluation is not. Aristotle is reluctant to apply moral appraisal to intellectual
virtues.48 In his theory, moral and intellectual virtues have different func-
tions, i.e., practical and theoretical, in relation to character and to knowledge,
respectively. Zagzebski is aware of the differences and argues against Aris-
totle’s strict separation between the realms of the theoretical and of the practi-
cal.49
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47 Zagzebski, “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good,” 24. See also Linda Zagzebski,
“Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About,” in Philosophical Papers 33
(2004): 368.
48 Aristotle writes, “We divide judgments into false and true, not into bad and good, whereas
decisions we divide more in the latter way.” Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.1111b33,
trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 126. Aristotle is aware
that judgment is also praised, but, “the judgment is praised by reference to how true it is.”
Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.1112a7 (Rowe 127).
49 See Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 137–164.
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The position that the (internal) value of knowledge consists in something
added to the value of the truth is often called epistemic value pluralism. The
position that the truth is the value that underlies any other (internal) value of
knowledge is called value monism.50
Sosa responded to Zagzebski’s epistemic value–pluralist challenge by re-
affirming his value monism. Though Sosa recognizes that different values are
involved in the value of knowledge, in one way or another, they all depend on
the value of truth, so that truth remains the fundamental epistemic value.51
Whether the pursuit of truth has a moral value and how the value of truth re-
lates to other values is a question that belongs to the domain of intellectual
ethics, which means that it is not necessary for the explanation of the specific
normativity which is implied in the concept of knowledge.52
Since it deals primarily with the relation between acts and consequences,
assuming that they can be abstracted from their agents, epistemic
consequentialism tends to be neutral regarding cognitive voluntarism and
moral appraisal of cognitive activity.53 Reliabilism is fairly successful in
avoiding the issue of epistemic responsibility and so it can avoid the question
of its relationship with moral responsibility. Virtue responsibilists’ tendency
to enter more deeply into the field of ethics makes it more entangled with the
problems of what is and what is not a specific moral value (and whether there
is one), with the problem of cultural and historical relativity of virtue, with
different concepts of eudemonia, and with a bunch of other expected and un-
expected thorny ethical issues. Of course, it’s worth it, if virtue
responsibilism is plausible.
3. Difficulties for the Ethical Models of Epistemic
Normativity
3.1 Autonomy of Theoretical Reason
I have pointed to some similarities between ethical and epistemic evaluation
which may support the case for a close connection between them. Let us now
have a look at some difficulties for that position. First difficulty is the estab-
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50 See Michael DePaul, “Value Monism in Epistemology,” in Knowledge, Truth and Duty, ed.
Steup, 170–186.
51 See Ernest Sosa, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology,” in Intellectual Virtue, eds. DePaul
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lished conviction in western thought that epistemology concerns theoretical
reason while ethics concerns practical reason, and these two domains should
be kept apart. At the base of this conviction is an ancient faculty psychology
that distinguishes the intellect and the will as two different faculties of the
soul, often as two different metaphysical parts of the soul. Many ancient and
medieval philosophers (including Aristotle, who gave that faculty psychol-
ogy a scientific format) warned that this distinction should not be regarded as
a separation, but that did not remove a certain unease about mixing epistemic
and ethical normativity together. The Enlightenment reaffirmed and
strengthened the division between the will and the intellect, an important
reason being the protection of the autonomy of science. Thus, although fac-
ulty psychology has been abandoned as a theory, it is still alive as a part of
mentality and a common assumption.
Our commonsense reluctance to introduce ethical, and hence practical
normativity into epistemology is not unfounded. We are suspicious that sub-
ordinating theoretical reasoning to practical normativity may weaken the ob-
jectivity of theoretical reason. The idea that theoretical reason has an objec-
tive aim seems more likely than the idea that practical reason as such does so.
Whatever difficulties we have with reaching the agreement on what is the
fact, reaching the agreement on what is good looks even trickier: Why risk it?
Of course, our common sense is no stranger to moral evaluation of cogni-
tive activity either, and not without reason. One possible response to the
aforementioned suspicion is that even if we accept that theoretical reason is
more successful in obtaining objectivity in cognition, still theoretical reason
alone cannot explain the imperative of epistemic objectivity for the subject.
We may need ethical normativity in order to protect the objectivity of theoret-
ical reasoning against the unjustified or harmful meddling of pragmatic sub-
jective motivations.
But are ethical factors necessary for the understanding of knowledge and
similar epistemic normative concepts? Does a proposition of the type “S
knows that p (and not only truly believes that p)” contain moral praise for S? Is
it necessary to be a good person to know that p? Our first intuition is that
knowledge does not have to be a moral appraisal. First, it is true that we give a
person credit for knowledge, but we give her the same credit for her intelli-
gence and good memory, and this does not necessarily imply moral praise.
Second, an excellent knower can be a bad person that lacks important virtues
like intellectual honesty and integrity, and hardly shows any love for truth.
The defenders of the moral nature of the epistemic appraisal of knowledge
will have to show that a person who lacks virtuous motivation for her belief to
be true and justified does not deserve credit for knowledge even if her true be-
liefs are produced in an otherwise reliable way. Put in that way, that does not
look an easy task. It is not impossible, though. Our tendency to give the title of
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knowledge too quickly in some areas rather than in the others, as well as our
assumption of reliability of some forms of cognition might rightly be put in
question. The history of scientific and philosophical discoveries tends to give
more weight to the intellectual qualities of the subject and his virtuous moti-
vation rather than to the automatism of cognitive functions.
3.2 Voluntariness of Belief
The next problem, though not separated from the previous ones, is that there
seems to be a crucial difference between ethical and epistemic appraisal re-
garding the voluntariness of their respective objects of evaluation. Ethical
“ought” implies “can.” We will not blame a person (subjectively) for an action
that was not sufficiently under her control. The counterpart of action in epis-
temology is belief. But it does not seem that our beliefs, nor any of relevant
similar propositional attitudes (judgment, doubt, assent, withholding of as-
sent, opinion, wish, fear, and hope that p), are wholly under our control. Per-
ceptual beliefs, introspective beliefs, and simple inferences—which make up
the largest part of our beliefs—do not seem to be under our control at all.
Therefore, if we have control over our beliefs at all, its range must be rather re-
stricted. If an epistemic “ought” contains a moral “ought” at all, it contains it
in a quite limited sense.54
Furthermore, though in the history of epistemology beliefs and judg-
ments were regularly referred to as cognitive or mental acts, that classification
has been put in question.55 The language of mental acts is not problematic in
the case of judgment, but mid–twentieth century analytic epistemologists
found it problematic in the case of belief, while at the same time judgment lost
its popularity. It is true that we can begin to believe that p and cease to believe
that p. The emphasis is on “we can,” because it is not only possible but it is fre-
quent to simply find yourself believing something. On the other hand, some-
times a belief unnoticeably evaporates. In the meanwhile the belief that p is
somehow there. We know it is there because we can activate it every so often,
and because it affects our behaviour even when we do not think about it ex-
plicitly. That is why belief is now usually categorized as a propositional dis-
position, i.e., a dispositional mental state or attitude in relation to the truth or
falsity of a proposition.
Of course, this new understanding of belief does not prove that belief is
involuntary. It does not exclude the assent or the decision to believe at the
DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA Dalibor Reni}: The Debate on Epistemic and Ethical Normativity
115
54 For this sort of argument against the moral evaluation in epistemology, see H.H. Price, “Be-
lief and the Will,” Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 28 (1954): 1–27.
55 See H.H. Price, Belief: The Gifford Lectures (London: George, Allen, Unwin, 1969), 20.
H:\USLUGE\fti\disphi\disphi11_sve.vp
11. travanj 2013 11:42:30
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
moment of its acquisition or reaffirmation. Actually, even if one acquires a be-
lief without explicit conscious participation, one will be required to affirm it
sooner or later. The recognition that belief is a dispositional state does, how-
ever, call attention to that foggy side of belief when it appears and vanishes
without explicit decision of its “owner.”
When we talk about deliberating on beliefs, deciding to believe, assenting
to beliefs, we presume that our beliefs are voluntary and that we can choose to
believe or not to believe in specific circumstances. The epistemological posi-
tion that believing is voluntary is called doxastic voluntarism.56 According to
the type or level of voluntary control in beliefs, epistemologists usually dis-
tinguish direct and indirect doxastic voluntarism. A subject has direct volun-
tary control over an act if he can do it or not do it by a simple intention, at will.
For instance, he can control his conduct as to raising his hand or not, accord-
ing to his intention. A subject has indirect voluntary control over an act if he
cannot do it at will, but can do it after a series of interventions in the process of
its realization. For instance, he cannot directly control his weight, but can
control it indirectly through a special diet.
The arguments against doxastic voluntarism point, first, to the problem
with the concept of voluntary belief and, second, to the psychological diffi-
culties with the voluntariness of belief. Regarding the concept of voluntary
belief, Bernard Williams argues that belief by definition aims at truth. If vol-
untariness of belief means that we can believe any proposition irrespective of
its truth, it seems that the concept of belief is irreconcilable with the concept
of voluntariness.57 This argument has got some support, but it has not been
found as clear and strong as Williams intended it to be.58 Nevertheless, there
is always the psychological argument, suggested by Williams too, but older
than that, and later more systematically exposed by William Alston.59 That
argument says that it is a psychological matter of fact that we do not and can-
not acquire beliefs voluntarily. The evidence simply imposes a belief on us
and we cannot not believe. We cannot just wish to believe and believe inde-
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pendently of the evidence. This is obvious in perceptual and inferential be-
liefs.
Alston argues that we do not have direct control over any of our beliefs,
not even in the case where, after weighing it up, the evidence remains uncer-
tain or is completely lacking. One simply cannot “bring himself into a state of
belief that p,” not even in philosophical, political, religious, scientific mat-
ters, or other people’s witness. The deliberation process did not mean that the
belief which resulted was voluntary. The subject simply had to accept the re-
sult of the deliberation process. Alston allows some distant indirect voluntary
influence on the process of belief forming, e.g., a voluntary selection of the di-
rections and sources of evidence, or developing habits of inquiry, but he does
not consider it strong enough to support an ethical model of epistemic evalua-
tion.60
I must say that I have not found any epistemologist who defends direct
doxastic voluntarism. Even those epistemologists from the past who are said
to have held it (such as Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Newman, and
Lonergan) probably would not agree with its most radical form. They believed
that cognitive acts are human acts, and therefore acts of will, but for them an
act of will was not necessarily an act at will.
Those epistemologists who defend a stronger connection between ethical
and epistemic appraisal have found different strategies against the psycholog-
ical counter–argument. One way is to argue that deciding to believe is indeed
psychologically and conceptually possible.61 The other way is to argue that
even an indirect influence of the will in the belief–forming process is a suffi-
cient reason to talk about an ethical appraisal in epistemology. So, instead of
doxastic voluntarism, it may be more adequate to speak of cognitive agency.
On this line virtue responsibilists (Zagzebski, Montmarquet) argue that the
epistemic appraisal depends on the intellectual virtue, and the virtue is suffi-
ciently under our control.62 For this reason the debate about the ethical fac-
tors in epistemic normativity between virtue responsibilists and virtue
reliabilist does not focus on the voluntariness of belief but on the nature of
epistemic value. Both virtue reliabilists and responsibilists agree that knowl-
edge is a form of credit given to the person for her virtuous belief, even if they
do not agree as to whether that credit is of a moral nature or not. Giving credit
implies some voluntary involvement of the subject in the acquisition of
knowledge in both cases. When we give credit to an excellent ballerina we
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premise that her excellence is in an important measure a result of her own
hard work even if the appraisal of her excellence is not a moral one.
Henry Price and Jonathan Cohen are among those epistemologists who
argue that belief cannot be voluntary, but still allow voluntariness in other
cognitive attitudes, such as assent and acceptance.63 Their concession, how-
ever, may not be necessary. Their notion of belief may have been too involun-
tary from the very beginning. For example, they define belief as a “cognitive
feeling” (Price) or “credal feeling” (Cohen).64 These terms would probably
find little understanding anywhere outside the classical empiricist tradition.
Some epistemologists noticed that different positions regarding the free-
dom of the will and regarding the concept of responsibility in ethics result in
different positions on the voluntariness of belief. Hence, if we show that a di-
rect or strong libertarian voluntarism is not necessary for the ethical appraisal
proper, we should not demand it for the ethical model of epistemic appraisal
either.65 Actually, it is the notion of epistemic responsibility and not the no-
tion of voluntariness that we need to connect epistemic normativity with eth-
ics.
4. Nexus
Rather than conclusion, it seems to be more suitable to speak of a nexus at the
end of this article, in the sense that a nexus opens up the horizon of a topic – it
creates new connections. There has been some dissatisfaction with analytic
epistemology in the epistemological circles of continental philosophy, the
former being accused of (too much) fixation at the conceptual analysis of
knowledge. Without damaging the basic epistemological and metaphysical
realism which is tacitly presupposed as the common ground for most of the
participants in the mainstream epistemological debates, it could be fruitful to
examine the role of the cognitive subject in knowledge precisely with the pur-
pose to secure an ethical and metaphysical warrant for that common ground.
It has somehow happened that the debate on epistemic reliabilism re-
opened the question of the metaphysical foundations for the reliability of hu-
man cognitive functions. In a similar way, responsibilist virtue epistemology
has reopened the question of the role of the subject, including the subject’s
moral and epistemic integrity, in the acquisition and the future developments
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of knowledge. In an age of naturalization of philosophy, the whole debate on
epistemic normativity may sound as a sort of epistemic romanticism, but we
cannot deny that it has attracted a lot of interest among the older as well as the
younger generation of epistemologists. Finally, it is us, human beings, cogni-
tive subjects that acquire knowledge and do epistemology.
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